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SLOVENIAN - CROATIAN BORDER DISPUTE:  
A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
INTRODUCITON 
 
Slovenian – Croatian border dispute is seemingly becoming a defining moment for 
Slovenian diplomacy and foreign policy in general. Slovenian intellectuals, as well as 
top Slovenian politicians are fully engaged into debate of how to resolve the dispute, 
and the dispute as such is seen as a test of defending national interests, as well as a 
historic opportunity for Slovenian foreign policy to assert itself in the international 
arena.1 However, the almost exclusively debated pretext is legal aspect of the dispute, 
while political is, except for very general statements, hidden from the public eye. That 
is, to some extent, logical. Since the process is still in its unresolved stage, the detail 
political information is often highly sensible and could damage the positions of both 
countries. This could be the reason why Slovenian politicians that are currently in 
                                                          
1 See for example opinions (just to name most recent ones) of president of Slovenian Society for 
International Relations Kunič (2009), who stresses that Slovenian diplomacy should do its job and 
convince other key people in international society to reach the decision in our favor, prime minister 
Pahor (2009) who stresses that the signing of arbitration agreement is a historical achievement, 
and opposition Janša (2009) who stresses that resolving Slovenian-Croatian border dispute is in 
the top national interest. 
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ruling positions do not wish to publicly discuss the subject matter. What is more 
surprising is the silence of opposition politicians and especially academics.  
 
Not diminishing the importance of the legal aspect of conflict, the purpose of this 
essay is to analyze the object, as well as the course of the dispute and its implications, 
from the political perspective. The article will thus analyze the course and the object 
of dispute on the basis of negotiation and conflict-resolution theories, and the conflict 
implications for Slovenia and Croatia. With that, it strives to offer objective 
understanding of the conflict and to indicate possible solutions. Since the dispute has 
now escalated to the point where Slovenia is threatening with a referendum on 
accession of Croatia into the EU, I believe that such understanding is needed more 
than ever, in order to resolve the conflict satisfactory for both parties.   
 
THE COURSE OF THE PROCESS  
 
Slovenian-Croatian border dispute is dragging on virtually from Slovenia’s 
independence.2 At first, conflict was flared up only occasionally when Croatian 
fishermen came into the administrative waters of Slovenia in Piran bay3 and were 
there usually met with Slovenian police boat, also with Croatian police often engaged 
in the incident. The first crucial point in the dispute came with signing of the so-
called Drnovšek-Račan agreement. Surprisingly, the agreement was ratified by 
Slovenian parliament, but not by Croatian. The agreement addressed all the key 
issues in the conflict: the demarcation of Piran bay, Slovenia access to international 
waters, status of four villages, situated on disputed land territory by the river 
Dragonja and preservation of Croatian border with Italy. However, the so-called 
“back-channel” or closed-for-public negotiations between Slovenian and Croatian 
prime minister failed to mobilize favorable broader political public opinion to the 
agreement in Croatia. According to Wanis-st. John4 such top-level secret negotiations 
can be successful at early stages of negotiating an agreement, however, when 
agreement in principle is reached, both sides need to carefully and gradually include 
the public into the process, in order to ensure wide support and thus later acceptance 
of the agreement in the home country. On Slovenian side, Prime Minister Drnovšek 
had been able to gain broader support of the political elites and broader public quite 
fast, and Slovenian parliament subsequently ratified the agreement, while Croatian 
Prime Minister Račan was not able to get support of his coalition government, nor 
the broader public opinion. The aftermath was a failed negotiation process, loss of 
credibility, and perhaps the most crucial development for events that we are 
witnessing today, the strengthening of the so-called spoilers. Spoilers are people or 
                                                          
2 I do not wish to present the fact about the dispute or legal aspect, but only to analyze key occurances 
in the course,  for those not familliar with the dispute, see factual and legal analysis of Avbelj and 
Letnar Černič (2007) as a pre-reading of this article. 
3 Since the independence, Slovenian police controls the whole Piran pay except for 278 meters wide 
strip of sea along Croatian coast of the bay (Avbelj and Letnar Černič 2007, 16). 
4 Wanis-st. John (2006) 
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interest groups that a priori oppose an agreement, and when negotiations fail their 
voice gains power. After refusal of Croatian parliament to ratify the agreement, 
accusations that he was acting in breach of constitution were directed towards Račan 
from political leaders, opposed to the agreement. Here also has to be noted that 
Slovenia was not compassionate towards Račan’s problems with gaining support – 
instead of giving him more time and acting discreetly, Slovenian politicians and 
authorities were acting as if the agreement is already in force.5   
 
The governments of both countries had to change in order to give the process another 
try. First, for appeasement purposes, the Declaration of avoidance of incidents (Izjava 
o izogibanju incidentov) that aimed at preventing before mentioned fisherman 
incidents in Piran bay that had a potential of escalation, was signed in summer 
2005.6 In summer 2007, then Slovenian Prime Minister Janša and his Croatian 
counterpart Sanader, both members of oppositional parties at the time of failure of 
Drnovšek-Račan agreement, had reached an agreement in principle that the dispute 
will be resolved at the International Court of Justice.7  However, next year, the regime 
change occurred in Slovenia and the new government could not reach agreement with 
Croatian counterparts about some other conditions, namely whether ICJ should in its 
deliberations include the ex aequo et bono princilpe.   
 
The event that had the biggest implications for the current situation was Slovenian 
blockade of the pre-accession talks between Croatia and the EU in December 2008. 
The blockade occurred because Croatia had included in its negotiation 
documentations certain clauses that could serve as a legal prejudice of border setting 
on the disputed land and sea territories. The blockade was a relatively unforeseen 
escalation of conflict that was now growing out of local dimensions. No one has until 
now seriously implied that Croatia had put the controversial clauses in the documents 
intentionally, so the event might be seen as the unintentional last push that was 
needed in order to flare up the conflict’s political dimension. After the event, the 
conflict is more than ever before developing in accordance with structural change 
model of escalation. The model, developed by Pruitt and Rubin8, argues that 
“conflict, and the tactics used to pursue it, produce residues in the form of changes in 
the parties and the communities to which the parties belong”. There are three groups 
of structural changes: psychological changes, changes in groups and collectives and 
changes in the community surrounding the parties.  
 
As regards psychological changes, it is distinct that the party on the other side 
becomes seen as self-centered, morally unfit or even a diabolical enemy. Of course, 
Slovenia does not see Croatia as diabolical, nor vice-versa is true; however, attitudes 
                                                          
5 Zelnik 2004, 58–9: Slovenian police boats were driving croatian fishermen from would-be Slovenian 
territorial waters 8according to Drnovšek-Račan agreement).  
6 Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve (2005) 
7 RTVSLO (2007) 
8 Pruitt & Rubin (1985)  
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are shifting and in our particular case, the other side is more often than not blamed 
for stalemates (for example, parties directly blamed each other for not being 
“constructive” when different EU proposals for solution were not accepted either by 
one or the other side). Also, emotions are flaring up – politicians in Croatia angrily 
emphasize that they will not “sell” Croatian territory for entering the EU, while 
Slovenian politicians see Croatia as bad-behaved child that does not want to adhere 
to what they see as their legitimate demands. As regards the zero-sum thinking, 
another characteristic of psychological change, it is gaining on force. The 
predominant conviction (from Slovenian point of view)9 is either we get the bay and 
sea that will allow us to access international waters, or they do, while the other 
opinions (such as condominium) are dismissed on both sides. Also, there is no 
empathy: legitimacy of Croatian acts and demands has until now not been seriously 
discussed. Fear of small losses is present and has come thus far that even grammar 
formulations in the arbitrage agreement are being discussed.10 At the collective level, 
changes are seen in the form of emergence of extreme actors in both parties in 
conflict or mild actors taking more extreme positions. In Slovenia, some “hawkish” 
leaders of different initiatives are now regularly included in public debates, and top 
politicians are now willing to resort to such radical measures as referendum. As 
regards the polarization in broader community, previously uninterested third parties, 
such as legal academics are now joining the discussion, not only as professionals but 
also in a role of taking-sides public opinion-makers.11    
 
Understanding the course of the conflict, especially developments after Slovenian 
blockade and consequences of those developments is important for solving the 
conflict. As it was shown, current tense situation is a consequence of a “natural” 
escalation of conflict that happens if the conflict is not properly addressed, and not a 
consequence of unwillingness of one or the other party. Understanding this is 
extremely important for changing the view of the other party, since this frees the 
actors of negative perceptions and enables them to direct their energy into finding 
suitable solution. However, to find a suitable solution, one needs to analyze the object 
of dispute. 
 
THE OBJECT OF THE DISPUTE    
 
The object of the dispute, namely the disputed areas are of course well known. 
However the interests behind the parties or, better to say, the reasons, upon which 
the interests were formed, are not. The importance of those reasons is paramount, 
since one does not want to get into a situation, described with a well-known “orange” 
                                                          
9 At this point, I have to recognise that most of my arguments will be based on examples, derived from 
Slovenian actions, since I am, because i am Slovenian, more familiar with the attitudes towards the 
conflict here than in Croatia.  
10 It is discussed whether the word »junction«, written in the agreement means actual connection of 
Slovenian territory ar only access that allows free passage.  
11 See for example Dnevnik (2009) 
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example.12 The example tells of two children that quarreled over an orange. They 
have agreed to divide the fruit in half. The first child then ate its half and threw the 
peel away, while the other threw away the edible part and used the peel to bake a 
cake. Could something similar be said about the reasons behind Croatian and 
Slovenian interests? 
 
If we transform all the disputed areas into smaller “sub-disputes”, one could argue 
that there exist four interconnected sub-disputes: Slovenia’s junction with the 
international waters, control of Piran bay, preservation of direct border between 
Coratia and Italy and the question of River Dragonja and the four villages on the 
disputed land territory.   As regards the first sub-object of dispute, Slovenia’s junction 
with international waters, the arguments of Slovenia is that this is vital national 
interest, while Croatia sees it as giving away its own territory. However, reason why 
this junction is so important for Slovenia has up do date not been clearly rendered. If 
this is undisturbed operation of the port of Luka Koper, than this does not stand, 
while UNCLOS convention assures innocent passage of ships through territorial 
waters of another country. Of course, the other country could in practice not take 
heed of this provision;13 however this is again based on the before discussed 
adversary perception of the other party, based on the structural change. Also, if this 
should happen, Slovenia can legitimately evoke the breach of Copenhagen Criteria14 
in the point where EU candidate country must meet the political criteria of the rule of 
law, and after Croatia’s accession into the EU other, even stricter mechanisms. 
Moreover, if Slovenia had agreed to solve the dispute in front of the ICJ, the analyses 
state that the most likely decision would have been condominium (co-ownership) of 
at least one part of the Piran bay so that it would ensure the junction of Slovenian 
territorial waters with international waters15, which is even higher assurance for 
Slovenia that the operation of Luka Koper will be undisturbed.    
 
The second sub-object of dispute is actual control of Piran bay. Slovenia’s argument is 
that its control Piran bay is preservation of sea for the well-being of local inhabitants 
and development of tourism. As regards the first part that comprises mainly of 
fishery rights, EU member states have delegated their rights to the EU, and fishing 
quotas are now determined on a supranational level.16 That means that control over 
the Piran bay by either side would not make any difference after Croatia’s accession 
in EU. Development of tourism is also not hindered, as long as both countries are 
committed to preserving the environment, and neither side has until now proved 
otherwise. Perhaps also because of this fact, the question of control of Piran bay is 
now a bit less publicly discussed as the question of junction.  
 
                                                          
12 See Fisher, Ury & Patton (1981, 57) 
13 Avbelj & Letnar Černič (2007, 17) 
14 See Europa Glossary: Accession Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria) 
15 See for example Avbelj & Letnar Černič (2007, 18), Sheppard (2009) 
16 Avbelj & Letnar Černič (2007, 18) 
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The third sub-object of the dispute is preservation of direct border between Italy and 
Croatia. The preservation of this border is important for Croatia from the legal 
perspective: retaining the border legally ensures Croatia a status of being a party to 
the Treaty of Osimo17 and with that the political benefits that stem form the Treaty, 
such as compensations for former inhabitants of Free Territory of Trieste, minority 
protection and other benefits.18 In Drnovšek-Račan agreement, the solution was a 
creation of small triangle of Croatian territorial waters adjacent to Italian territorial 
waters in the bay – a very clever and creative solution, based on identifying interest of 
both countries behind the object of dispute and then solving it in a way that pleased 
them both. Also, condominium would provide for the continuation of Croatian-
Italian border. 
 
Last sub-object is land territory along the river Dragonja and four villages that are 
situated on that strip of land. Since Slovenia has as a part of the Drnovšek-Račan 
agreement been willing to trade the territory with Croatia in exchange for getting 
almost whole Piran bay and access to international waters, one may conclude that 
obtaining this territory is not the top priority for Slovenia. In Drnovšek-Račan 
agreement, it was agreed that for the well-being of locals in these villages, double 
citizenship will be offered to them, however, even that will not matter anymore once 
Croatia enters the EU. 
 
As follows from the analysis above, all interests behind the four sub-objects in the 
dispute except for the fourth one can be solved through the condominium solution, 
and none of them seems to be in the “vital interest” of one or another country, as long 
as those two countries abide to the principles of already existing international law. 
However, the conflict still is not solved, and the protraction of the conflict has 
negative consequences for both countries.  
 
CONFLICT IMPLICATIONS 
 
Of course, some implications of conflict are already clearly visible, especially as 
regards Croatia. Freezing of accession negotiations of Croatia with the EU was of 
course a setback for the country, one that may have even partly contributed to 
stepping down of Prime Minister Ivo Sanader. However, there also exist not so easy 
tractable and measurable implications, on national as well as international level. As 
regards the former, diverting attention of public in both countries from important 
political and socio-economic themes that need to be addressed and broadly 
supported in the society, especially in the current economic situation, towards the 
border dispute, does not serve for the benefit of the people. Thus, top politicians of 
                                                          
17 Treaty, signed in 1975 between Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Italy that among others divided 
Free Teritorry of Trieste, however it also contains some important provisions for countries that 
border Italy (successors of the Treaty).  
18 Mladina (2009) 
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both countries should focus their energy and time for other, more pressing problems 
of their country. Even though this may to some extent look like a populist argument, 
not dealing with internal economic problems and instead diverting its attention only 
at the field of foreign policy is supposed to be one of the reasons for eventual fall 
Račan’s government.19 In Slovenia, these internal implications, at least as regards 
changes at top political level, are not so visible; however, protracted dispute could be 
one of the reasons for decreasing public approval of the current government. Also, it 
contributes to further polarization in society which is, at has been shown above, 
further hindering the solution of the problem and is ensuring for continuation of its 
spiral mode. 
 
It was also often argued that both countries are losing reputation in the international 
community. However, both countries are, according to Sasha Baillie’s analysis of how 
can small states pursue their goal and make strength out of their perceived weakness, 
also losing its influence in international community. According to Baillie, small state 
must, among others, resort to coalition-building tactics, keeping low profile in 
multinational negotiations (especially in EU) and attract attention only when its vital 
interest is at stake, and playing a honest broker in negotiations between other, 
greater powers in international community.20  
 
As regards the first tactic, country must always strive for establishing friendly 
relations with other small states in order to gather greater leverage behind those 
goals that are shared with other small countries. Disputes such as discussed one do 
not exactly help maintaining such friendly relations and are hindering coalition-
building in other areas, since such disputes assure for overall degradation of trust 
between countries. Since Slovenia and Croatia are otherwise economically and 
geographically interconnected and thus share a vast array of common interests, such 
a dispute can be even more damaging to both countries. 
 
Since a small country risks that it will be overheard if it raises its voce too often since 
it does not have enough power to affect big changes in relationships in the 
international community, and is thus not important to appease it, small country has 
to choose the moments where and when it will raise its voice very carefully. It has to 
save such hard line performance only when its national interests are truly at stake, in 
order to ensure that it will gain attention of other countries. Raising its voice too 
many times for trivial matters will, on the other hand, assure for not being taken 
seriously by other countries. In this respect, it could be said that Slovenia and Croatia 
are misusing their limited powers at convincing the EU and the whole international 
community that their vital interests are at stake in the dispute. 
 
                                                          
19 Zelnik (2004, 57) 
20 Baillie (2009, 202–205)  
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Honest broker is the third tactics, with which small state can gain influence. That 
means that it will be playing a role of in-between link between great powers in 
negotiation. It will either facilitate the meeting or even draft proposals and thus be 
actively involved in the process. The role of honest broker assures the small state of 
the central position in the interaction process, at the very source of information, and 
can thus to some extent influence actions of bigger countries. From that point of view, 
the Bush-Putin meeting in Slovenia was a huge success for Slovenian diplomacy. 
Also, foreign politics of Scandinavian countries is based on this principle, and their 
mediators are well known. One of them (Marti Ahtissari, Nobel peace prize winner 
for its mediation efforts) was even briefly proposed as a mediator in the discussed 
dispute. However, big powers will only accept small country as honest broker if the 
country advertises conflict-avoidance stance and practice and willingness to 
cooperate in the international community. The dispute is thus eroding the perception 
of Slovenia and Croatia as conflict-avoidance countries, and is with that also it is 
eroding their power in the international community.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The key goal of both countries in the dispute should not be not how to get the whole 
disputed territory under one or the other’s control, but how to achieve de-escalation 
of conflict, intelligent analysis of interests behind the objects of conflict and how to 
maintain or reestablish their international credibility. Even if an unlikely event 
happens and one county wins in every aspect of the dispute and other loses, this 
would still be a Pyrric victory. One of the main negotiation principles is that 
confrontational problem-solving can only be successful (and even that even only in 
some cases) when one is dealing with one-time adversary, and not with a counterpart 
with whom it will still have to cohabitate and cooperate in the future, since such 
confrontational problem-solving will most likely tainted the relationship for a longer 
time.  
 
There exist two options for solving the conflict in an appeasing way. One is delegation 
of the dispute to a higher authority, and the other is solving the problem between 
them. As regards the first one, it can be tricky, as it can be well seen on the discussed 
example. Since more tribunals exist, many countries fall into the trap of “forum-
shopping”, i.e. trying to delegate the case to such a tribunal, for which they perceive it 
will be most favorable to them. In the past, Slovenia had proposed that the dispute 
should be delegated to OSCE tribunal, while Croatia had preferred the tribunal in 
Hamburg. They finally agreed for ICJ, however, that did not go through since 
Slovenia was trying to reach more favorable judgment (in their perception) with 
including the ex aequo et bono principle. In such complicated cases, negotiation 
literature proposes that solution should be based on “objective principles”. Since ICJ 
is most experienced with solving territorial disputes, this seems as objectively the 
best place for the resolution of the conflict, even if Croatia refuses the inclusion of ex 
aequo et bono principle into deliberations of judges. Also, both countries would be 
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able to present the ICJ judgment as “objective” and thus neither of them would blame 
or resent the other for losses. Case for solving the dispute in front of ICJ is even 
stronger if the most likely judgment, that is condominium, is taken into an account. 
However, if the countries decide to try to solve the dispute between them once more, 
they should not forget the principles of Back-channel conflict solving and do 
everything that is in their power to appease public and present it with rational 
arguments instead of passionate rhetoric or one that is to focused on the legal aspect, 
and limit possible spoilers. I think that everyone can agree that smooth and quick 
resolution of the conflict is in the top interest of both countries. 
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